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TRUTHS OF EXISTENCE AND OF 'MEANING 
GEORGE P. ADAMS 
.Any reflection upon the meaning and nature of truth, any 
attempt to construe a theory of knowledge, is confronted by an 
initial paradox. We set out to know what knowing and what 
knowledge are. We endeavor to make true assertions about 
truth. Now, in every other instance where we try to understand 
the nature of anything, we stand off from it, survey it from 
without, and gradually close in upon it from a variety of differ-
ent approaches. The object of our study is not, at the outset, 
within our grasp. The knowledge which we aim to poss.ess is 
absent till comprehension and understanding arrive, if they ever 
do. If now we regard the aim to know what knowledge is as 
on all fours with the aim to know what,· say, the stars are, we 
shall have to say that until we discovei: the nature of knowledge, 
we stand outside of knowledge. Our reflection and inquiry, our 
observation of knowledge ought then to be as external to and 
as independent of knowledge, as our telescopes are with respect 
to the stars. Eyes and telescopes 'do not imply stars, and they 
are not made of stars. But our assertions about truth should 
themselves be true, and every step in our perceiving and reflect-
ing upon knowledge implies and is compacted of that which we 
aim eventually to obtain, namely luwwledge. Yet, if the knowl-
edge of knowledge. is like the knowledge of anything else, we 
ought not to use and to possess knowledge till the consummation 
of our quest. It is as if, in order to build a telescope, we had 
already to possess that vision of the stars which only the com-
pleted telescope can provide. Were this the case, it is clear that 
we could never build telescopes. Yet the analogous and no less 
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paradoxical belief that we have to possess knowledge before we 
can acquire it was certainly held by Plato, and it bears witness, 
I believe, to an inescapable truth of the knowledge situation and 
problem. It is, as I hope to make evident, one aspect of this 
parado.x which will enter into the subsequent discussion. 
Suppose it should turn out to be the case that knowledge and 
truth are elusive and-in the words of one of the titles of the 
present series of papers-inaccessible. The paradox is even 
greater. I can well picture the possibility of contriving a trap 
to ensnare an animal and forever failing to catch it. The pro-
cedure becomes a bit complicated-as we have just now noted-
when the process of trap-building presupposes that you have 
already caught your beast. But what are we to say if, in order 
to make the trap we must not only already have caught our 
::i,nimal, but also that the trap is of a kind which by its very 
nature is precluded from catching any prey whatever. If truth 
is inaccessible, it becomes a pious but forlorn hope that the 
statements made in support of that thesis shall themselves be 
true. I should be content if I could deal with the lesser paradox, 
that which is involved in the search for knowledge about lmowl-
edge itself, and in the admission that propositions concerning 
truth should themselves be true. 
I begin with what might seem to be the least controversi_al 
statement that can be made about knowledge, the statement 
namely that knowledge is concerned with and is about that 
which in some sense exists and has existen.ce. Whoever possesses 
knowledge, apprehends, grasps, portrays, images, represents, 
conceives, is confronted with, is compresent with, some situation, 
fact, relation, or entity which is just what it is and just what 
it is known as being. This would appear to be the minimum 
statement which could be made of any knowledge situation, if 
· and when there is knowledge. This minimum statement com-
mits us to no assertion that knowledge, the cognitive confront-
ing of existence and a knower, is ever attainable, except indeed 
such knowledge as is conveyed by this assertion itself. It com-
mits us to no special account of the mechanism which may be 
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supposed to render knowledge possible, if it is possible. Nor 
does it restrict in any fashion the kind or domain of existence-
if there be a variety of such domains-with which knowledge is 
concerned. If I know that the product of x + y and x - y is 
x2 - y2, that light travels with a velocity of 299,796 kilometers 
per second, that Keats wrote Endymion, that envy ·corrodes the 
soul-if I or anyone indeed know these things or any things 
whatever, then it is something somehow existing with which I 
have cognitive dealings. Did nothing whatever exist, and could 
this be known, then the one existing object of knowledge would 
be the fact that nothing exists. If any such situation be barely 
conceivable, then of course the kind of existence which such a 
fact must have (in order to be known) will be quite different 
from the kind of existence ·which this fact denies, and perhaps 
different too from the kind of existence which belongs to the 
knowledge of this fact. Existence of some sort, and in some 
dimension, is ineluctably correlative with knowledge. This pos-
session of existence, or this just being an existence of some kind, 
on the part of anything whatever which is the object of knowl-
edge, lies at the root of the deep-seated conviction that the 
object of lmowledge is and must be independent of its being 
known. Without this characteristic of "independence," knowl-
edge is meaningless and impossible. For to say of anything 
that it is independent of any knowledge of it, is just another 
way of saying that it has existence. If the ascription of an 
independent status to the object of knowledge goes beyond the 
ascription of existence, as it frequently does, it may easily prove 
to be ambiguous or positively misleading. 
We are, I think, placing emphasis here upon what Mr. 
Loewenberg designated as the 'terminal' aspect and preposition 
of the knowledge situation. . Existence is that which knowledge 
is about. Our human interest in knowledge and i:q the problem 
of its nature and possibility, bears witness to the most perdur-
able metaphysical bent of our nature, the desire to discover and 
to know that which has the maximum of existence, that which 
· really exists. This marks indeed the goal of lmowledge. It is 
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'terminal' and consummatory in a pregnant sense. For this 
reason it has, I think, a rightful ascendancy, the due recogni-
tion of which should not lay one open to the charge of the 
'' fallacy of suppression'' or ''reduction.'' When the goal of 
your, journey is indeed of surpassing importance, it matters 
relatively little what the conveyance is, or with what else it 
may chance to be freighted, and where it may have originated, 
or how rough the road may be, provided you do reach your 
terminus. Some vehicle and some road upon which it may travel 
are indeed indispensable and in this sense it were idle to sup-
press them. But the role which they play is subordinate, ·when 
measured against the significance and urgency of the terminus 
to which they are believed to lead. It is for the sake of that 
which exists that the arduous and tortuous journey of knowl-
edge-seeking, of science and philosophy, is entered upon, and 
if the journey prove longer than we anticipated when, with light 
heart, we climbed upon our vehicle, even if every supposed 
terminus prove to be but a station en route, and we become so 
absorbed in the passing scenery as to forget our destination, 
nevertheless, the raison d'etre of our journey is inevitably the 
goal. Yet, intriguing as is this metaphor, which I borrow from 
Mr. Loewenberg, it has, like all metaphors, its dangers, and we 
must now relinquish it, as we set forth upon our journey. 
There is, it would seem, a necessary corollary to the state-
ment that knowledge is ineluctably and supremely concerned 
with, or that it is about, existence. We are not, I may remind 
you, saying anything as yet as to the possibility or impossibility 
of obtaining knowledge, or of knowledge reaching its object or 
goal, which is existence. We are concerned with the concept 
of knowledge, with its nature, with what it would be, did it 
anywhere exist. To say that knowledge is directed upon and is 
about existence, appears to imply that knowledge is the posses-
sion of a· being who, as kno,ver, is a sheer spectator of the exist-
ences which are known. I say "appears to imply" because we 
shall find before we are finished that this assumption will require 
revision, and that knowledge is never such a confronting of sheer 
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existence by a purely contemplative and finding mind. But for 
the moment I shall depict a knower as if he were a bare spec-
tator of existence. As such, it might appear that he must be 
careful not to intrude into his knowledge anything that does 
not come from the side of the existence to be known. Above all, 
he must be careful to exclude all that arises from his own 
nature, his own life and experience, his own hopes and inter-
ests. His business, as knower, is just to register existence. The 
medium in which such registering occurs ought to be diaphanous, 
with no thickness and life of its own, without bias, flaw, or per-
spective. This may, alas, be only an ideal of what knowledge 
should be, only remotely attainable by our minds harnessed as 
they are to animal bodies. But whether or not attainable by us, 
or to what extent, how deeply has this ideal of what knowledge 
really is when it is indeed knowledge, entered into the historical 
structures of philosophic thought about the nature of knowledge ! 
But no less clear is it that beings such as we are, are com-
pelled to assume an attitude toward the things surrounding us, 
very different from that of contemplative gazing upon existence. 
We have wants and needs which impel us to do something to 
the objects in our ,vorld, to enjoy and to destroy, to escape 
dangers, to discriminate between friend and foe, to make, con-
trol, and exploit what exists so as to transform it to our own 
.uses. All this implies that we are not disinterested spectators 
and knowers, but creatures with vital needs and impulses, com-
pelled to take sides, to choose and select, to pronounce things 
good and bad, or better and worse. So imperious are these vital 
and practical exigences of our animal and human· existence, that 
everything which transpires in our experience appears of neces-
sity to be caught up by and subservient to the life and the needs 
of our bodies, our minds, or our body-minds. Where in all this 
living matrix of the wants and interests belonging to us, which 
are indeed just ourselves, can a place be found for any sheer 
neutral registering of existence, undistorted by the vital and 
human medium in which of necessity such registration of exist-
ence must occur? It is small wonder that the attempt should 
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be deliberately and frankly made completely to redefine kno,vl-
edge in terms of our doing and living, trying and venturing, 
succeeding and failing, and wholly to relinquish any notion of 
knowledge as the faithful disclosure and registration of extra-
human existence. Yet even if it be granted that all which calls 
itself knowledge is a plan of action, utilized in the service of 
some vital and practical need and demand of our nature, such 
an admission does not expunge the deeply metaphysical and 
realistic impulse to discover and disclose that which exists. It 
may condemn the realization of such an impulse and desire to 
perpetual and pathetic frustration. It ought not, I think, impel 
us to allege, in the manner of the fable of the sour grapes, that 
we have no desire for a sheer knowledge of existence regardless 
of what are our vital and practical interests. The interest in 
knowledge is the interest not in ourselves but in existence. 
The interests which are other than cognitive and theoretic 
are diverse and multiform. Utilitarian and economic, moral 
and social, aesthetic and religious, is there any trait shared in 
common by all such non-theoretic interests, in terms of which 
they all fall within a common genus 1 Is there any one category 
germane to all these non-cognitive interests, as the _category 
of existence is correlative with and pertinent to knowledge? I 
think that there is. What this common characteristic is becomes 
evident when we observe that it is never the bare existence of 
things and situations which elicits our non-theoretic interest. 
Not, at any rate, such objective existence as is the correlate and 
the goal of knowledge. It is rather, the import and use, the 
value and significance which things have for us, that comprise 
the domain of our non-cognitive interests. A hungry creature 
searches for that which is good for eating. He can of course 
satisfy his hunger only with food which really exists, as a 
physical thing. But it is not its existence as contemplated and 
known impassively, but its use to him as food, its value, with 
which he is vitally concerned. And so it is with all of the 
varied non-cognitive interests. With each of these there is 
correlated some species of use, value, or significance. And I 
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propose that we sweep all of these objectives or termini of our 
non-cognitive interests into the one category of meaning. I 
propose to use ''meaning'' as the generic term for the kind of 
thing with which all of our experience, attitudes, and interests 
other than theoretic and cognitive, have to do. Desiring and 
avoiding, selecting and using, loving and hating, admiring and 
enjoying, striving and purposing-all these are attitudes and 
interests which are surely different from the interest in just 
knowing things, in contemplating and recording existences, in 
merely letting ''facts'' announce and register themselves. Just 
as existence is the objective and correlate of cognition so mean-
ing is the objective and correlate of our practical and vital, our 
aesthetic and moral, and all other non-theoretic concerns. 
But clearly, we need here to tread cautiously. We have dis-
tinguished meaning and existence. Existence is what we are 
bent upon when we seek just to know. Some sort of meaning 
it is-and meaning includes use or value-which concerns us 
when we do anything or everything except knowing. But do 
not meanings themselves exist? Some kind of existence they 
must assuredly have, else how could we talk about them, raise 
queries concerning them and inquire as to how they are related 
to existence? Indeed do we not try to know just what values 
and meanings are, that is, contemplate them as existences? .A.nd 
when we try thus to know them for what they are, as we do in 
the theory of value or the theory of meaning, they apparently 
cease to be definable in terms of a category which is contrasted 
with existence, and they become existences of some specific kind. 
What becomes then of our initial bifurcation between what 
thing·s are, what things exist as being, and what they mean? 
I shall not consider these perplexing questions in this place. I 
merely note that this subsumption of meaning under existence 
occurs only under the influence of the cognitive intent and may 
thus appear to verify our original statement that existence, and 
existence alone, is the correlate of knowledge. The meanings 
and values ·which things appear to wear are there only for some 
vital, practical, or aesthetic interest. Such meanings seem per-
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force to evaporate or to be transmuted into sheer neutral exist-
ence once we succeed in knowing them. And only if and when 
we are guided by some non-cognitive interest are we confronted 
with meanings and values. We might put it paradoxically and 
say that did nothing exist except existences, the only thing we 
could do would be just to lmow them. It is because meanings 
and values also exist or appear to exist, that there is grist for 
our vital, affective, emotional, practical, and purposive activities. 
We shall indeed before long have to face the question whether 
existences as sheer and detached from meaning and value could 
even be lmo,1'11. But the force and pathos of this question lies 
in the prior seeming necessity of divorcing existence and mean-
ing. That divorce seems decreed by the inexpungable distinc-
tion between the ideal and aim of knowledge and that of the 
mass of our vital, practical, non-cognitive interests. 
This bifurcation of knowledge directed upon sheer existence 
and all the non-cognitive modes of experience and of interest 
·which are implicated with meanings, is a characteristic achieve-
ment and deposit of the impetus given to modern philosophy by 
the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. Prior to 
that-if we neglect the possible foreshadowings of modern science 
in Greek atomism-there was no such clean-cut demarcation. 
Indeed, the outstanding trait of the classical Greek tradition 
in philosophy is the mutual interpenetration of that which is 
believed to exist, to be real, and that ·which is endowed with 
meaning, value, and significance. This tradition viewed human 
experience and human interests as integral to the total cosmic 
scene; that which was fraught with deepest significance within 
the boundaries of man's experience was at the same time taken 
as disclosing the framework of reality. Human use and want, 
man's needs and ideals, his purposes, the very grammar ·which 
lay imbedded within his discourse, the reason or Log·os inherent 
in his thinking, this was all linked continuously with that ·which 
was most deeply and really existent in the nature of things. 
The interpretation of nature, within this tradition, was teleo-
logical. The course and destiny of natural processes were 
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thought to be intelligible only in so far as they disclosed a 
pattern of purpose or meaning. The idea of the Good, of a 
significant order of things and of events, was not to be abstracted 
from in any inquiry as to what nature or reality really is. The 
motions of the heavenly bodies, the do,vnward fall of teiTestrial 
bodies no less than the growth and behavior of living things, 
obeyed the compulsion of pui'poses, meanings, and of final 
causes. A.ll such natural processes were indeed the realization 
of ends; they were not simply observable occurrences to be 
described for what they were and in their o,vn terms. Existence 
itself was permeated with meanings. Existence ·was but the 
scaffold or the husk behind which were the ideas, the meanings, 
the intelligible forms and final causes, whose apprehension ,vas 
the goal of the lover of true knowledge. 
Such inseparability and fusion (if not confusion) of exist-
ence and meaning is, it might appear, the witness of an inability 
to determine where the meanings germane to human life and 
experience, human reason and discourse terminate, and. where 
the bare existence of nature and reality begins. The ,Yorld of 
significant human meanings overflows into the realm of objective 
existence. It is something like this which is meant, I suppose, 
when it is said that the cosmology and metaphysics of this 
tradition were essentially, if unwittingly, humanistic and 
anthropomorphic. It is this tradition which persists in the 
scholastic doctrine that the order of existence coincides neces-
sarily with the scale of perfection and of value. The onto-
logical proof for the existence of God may perhaps be viewed 
as the logical culmination of this long tradition. So indis-
pensable is the maximum of existence to the maximum of mean-
ing and perfection that a non-existing ens perfectissimmn is a 
sheer contradiction. A.nd it is still something derived from this 
same tradition, transplanted into a different intellectual horizon, 
which moves within the structure of modern philosophical 
rationalism. 
The scientific revolution of the seventeenth century accus-
tomed men's minds to the thought of an external reality notably 
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different from that ·which was portrayed in the. classical Greek 
tradition. Instead of a reality which was all of a piece ,vith 
the meanings and values which rendered human experience sig-
nificant, men now believed themselves confronted by a causally 
and mechanically determined system of physical objects and 
events. This quantitative realm of metrical and primary 
motions was all that in truth really existed. The wealth of sig-
nificant qualities, the meanings and forms which were woven 
into the very texture of existence in the older tradition, were 
now excluded from objective reality. Instead of aiming at an 
understanding of the meaning which really belonged to things, 
the new science seeks solely to describe how the observable 
occurrences in nature go on. Not why bodies fall, not the grasp-
ing of that which a falling body realizes, the potentiality which 
it makes actual, the form and end which it achieves, but the 
simple how of the existent occurrences themselves becomes the 
objective of scientific study. Meanings, like purposes and values, 
no longer lie within the realm of objective existence. T~ey are 
of necessity expunged from that realm. Their association with 
and. their dependence upon mind becomes far more pronounced 
than it ever was in the Greek tradition. Instead of being found 
by mind when it contemplates and truly knows reality, they arc 
the creatures of mind, additions and fabrications adventitiously 
imputed to an existence to which they are wholly dissimilar and 
strange. 
There is, however, be it noted in passing, an extraordinary 
paradox which dogs the steps of the advancing theoretic con-
quest of nature in the modern scientific movement. lVIen set out 
to discover the independent, significantly neutral existence of 
the physical order. They seek to strip away from that order 
all secondary qualities (which are human meanings adventitious 
and eccentric to sheer existence), the tertiary aspects of value, 
of beauty, and of purposive, final causes. But the more this vast 
enterprise succeeds, the more do the existence and the nature 
thus disclosed coalesce with a structure which appears to have 
the very maximum of logical and theoretic significance, the 
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structure of mathematical truths and theorems, one which seems 
to be most completely independent of observation of fact and 
registering of sheer existence. Descartes' belief that matter, 
physical existence, is a res extensa, bears witness to the hold 
which the mathematical ideal had on his thought. For extended-
ness, spatiality, is the proper domain of geometrical forms and 
relations, rendered capable of algebraic development and deduc-
tion through the powerful instrument of analytical geometry. 
Here in this most highly developed region of knowledge, the 
existence of matter fuses with the meaning which mathematical 
symbols possess in a deductive and rational system. This insight 
of Descartes is deeply prophetic, I suspect, of the entire develop-
ment of modern physics. We set out originally to know sheer 
existence, we were distrustful of meanings, of secondary quali-
ties, of all that the mind's own creativeness imputed to existence. 
We discover, in the encl, that the only existence with which 
physical science is concerned is well on the way to being trans-
muted into a system of symbols and meanings. It is, as Mr. 
Eddington calls it, a '' shadow land,'' when measured against 
the solid, existential substance -which we originally set out to 
lmovv. If we still crave substance and existence, must we not 
shove them beyond the threshold which frames the farthest 
reaches of scientific knowledge f 
Yet this paradox-that the physical sciences set out to cap-
ture sheer existence and return from the chase with little or 
nothing save mathematical symbols and meanings-need not, 
perhaps, vitiate the legitimacy of the quest. And to all this 
it may well be retorted that if physics has become mathematics, 
and geometry mechanics, it means merely that the knowledge 
of mathematical existence ( or subsistence) has replaced or has 
come in part to overlap the lmowledg·e of physical existence. 
Hovvever, I think that it is perhaps either a foolish philosopher 
or a very very wise one who will venture today to say anything 
about the implications for philosophy of the present state-or 
flux-of the physical sciences, and I should prefer not to be 
forced into either one of these two categories. 
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We have been speaking thus far of knowledge with existence 
as its objective or correlate, and of non-cognitive interests whose 
correlate is some species of meaning. As yet, nothing has been 
said about truth. And I think it is right that knowledge should 
be surveyed before truth if, as ,ve have done, knowledge be 
viewed as directly concerned with existence. For, the relation 
between truth and existence is not so direct. It is not existence 
which is true, but knowledge of existence. Knowledge is the 
mediating link between truth and existence. There is a reflexive 
character about truth which appears to be lacking in knowledge. 
Truth supervenes upon knowledge or the claim to knowledge. 
It is the recognition, the certifying that knowledge is indeed 
knowledge. It is the result of passing judgment upon, of review-
ing and appraising· the claim which knowledge makes to appre-
hend existence. It presupposes that some or much or even all 
of what passes for knowledge is not really knowledge, just as 
legal judicial procedures, issuing in judgment, presuppose the 
possibility that some men who claim to be innocent and who 
pass as such, are really not innocent. There can be no erroneous 
knowledge any more than there can be an innocent man who is 
guilty. But a man can be judged guilty who claimed to be 
innocent, and who passed as innocent. Like,yise, knowledge 
may appear to exist, yet really not exist. Truth denotes the 
tribunal before which knowledge is summoned, to determine 
whether or no, or in what degree, it really is knowledge. · 
The designation of judgment as the locus of truth thus incli-
cates its reflexive and, with respect to knowledge, subordinate 
character. I have, or claim to have, lmowledge of the shining 
sun and fleecy clouds as, in some sense, really e_xisting. So far, 
all that is in evidence is knowledge-ideas, beliefs, perceptions-
on my part, and on the side of my world, existence. It is only 
when and if this lmowledge is challenged, ·when it is accused 
or indicted of not really being knowledge, or barely suspected 
of making a spurious claim, that I am called upon to plead 
before the tribunal of truth. The verdict is a judgment, judg-
ment in a crucial sense, "It is true or it is false that the sun is 
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shining.'' Knowledge is concerned ineluctably with existence; 
truth is a judgment directly focussed upon knowledge, and 
consequently, but only indirectly, upon existence, through the 
medium of knowledge. We might say that while knowledge is 
a dyadic relation between a knower and some· known existence, 
truth involves a triadic relation, adding to these two terms a 
third, something which, still to follow the analogy, plays the 
part of a judge or tribunal to pass judgment upon the validity 
of the presumed knowledge. The loyalties, so to speak, which 
we exact of knowledge and of truth are different. Of knowledge 
we ask fidelity to existence; of truth we require fealty to a 
standard, an ideal, a norm. 
I do not think that this difference between knowledge and 
truth is trivial or negligible. The entrance into the knowledge 
situation of factors which are derived from the concept of truth 
will lead us to modify the assertion which so far we have clung 
to, the assertion that knowledge, unlike all non-cognitive atti-
tudes, is concerned solely with existence. It will p,rompt us to 
regard as less intransigent the dichotomy of existence and mean-
ing, of theoretical and non-theoretical interests. For the con-
cept of truth brings to lig·ht a category, a dimension which 
mig·ht remain concealed ,vere it not for the distinction between 
knowledge and truth. If this notion of truth were lacking, if 
we had before us only the dyadic relation which thus far has 
appeared adequate to the knowledge situation, we might easily 
suppose that we could get along quite well with the category 
of existence alone. I think that this is just what is implied and 
attempted in cel'tain theories of knowledge. Take, for example, 
the correspondence theory of knowledge. Here you have on the 
one hand objective existences of various sorts such as physical 
objects and historical events. On the other hand you have sub-
jective or mental existences, perceptions, ideas, memories. You 
have in the third place an existing relation of one to one corre-
spondence between certain of the mental existences and certain 
of the objective existences. In so far as these three types of 
entities exist, there occurs an instance of knowledge. To be 
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sure, not all these three existent entities can be lnwwn. Perhaps 
the only one which is known is the subjective idea. The relation 
of correspondence, and the object which is other than the idea, 
may not be accessible. Nevertheless it is their sheer existence 
which defines and makes possible the existence of knowledge. 
The intent of any such theory is to move wholly within the area 
of entities which exist and occur. It exhibits the temper of 
positivism. 
The same may be said of any approach to the knowledge 
problem which supposes that one may view knowledge from 
without as an existing event or fact in the same manner as one 
may presumably observe any other sort of occurrence in nature, 
such as an eclipse of the moon, the ebbing of the tide, or the 
contraction of a muscle . 
.A similar temper of positivism, the supposal that knowledge 
may be surveyed from without as a set of existing occurrences, 
is evident, I think, in a pragmatic theory of knowledge. Know-
ing is now \o be viewed as a specific sort of process occurring 
in the life-history and behavior of certain organisms. One will 
study knowing precisely as one would observe digesting or walk-
ing. Knowing comes to exist whenever the continuity between 
stimulus and response which characterizes instinctive or habitual 
behavior is obstructed. Such obstruction may be due to com-
peting and divergent stimuli. Or, a given stimulus may tend 
to arouse various conflicting responses not all equally appro-
priate and useful. The organism thus finds itself in a state 
of doubt and suspense, because. its established modes of response 
to stimuli do not meet the requirements of its present environ-
ment or its existent needs. Knowledge is a name for the reso-
lution of this suspense, and the reestablishment of adequate 
modes of response. Such restitution is the result of analysis 
and discrimination, memory and inventiveness, the hypothetical 
projection of tentative modes of response, an experimental em-
barking upon one of them, and a resultant success or failure. 
We cannot pause to develop the details either of this type of 
theory, or of correspondence theories. I cite them as instances 
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of the assumption that the knowledge situation is a set of 
existent facts and processes, as capable of description from 
without as any other existences. It is just this assumption 
which I am forced to challenge. If by nature one means the 
existing totality of fac.ts and occurrences in space and time, 
including the entirety of biological phenomena, then the in-
gredient which makes knowledge knowledge, simply is not an 
existent, natural occurrence or entity. We are led into suppos-
ing that it is in part by the naturalistic assumption that every-
thing falling within the category of meaning or of value is an 
adventitious and anthropomorphic accretion to sheer existence, 
and that consequently to know things for what they really are 
is to know them solely in terms of existence stripped bare of 
all such meaning. And this assumption is the corollary of the 
sharp dichotomy between knowledge concerned with existence 
alone, and all non-cognitive interests which are implicated with 
meaning-s. I should say that the one outstanding merit and 
achievement of the modern pragmatic movement is its insistence 
upon the untenability and inadequacy of just this bifurcation 
and dichotomy. But I am far from being convinced that the 
pragmatic theory of the way m which theory and practice, 
existence and meaning, are to be brought together, points in 
the right direction. 
It is the concept of truth which stands in the ·way of any 
description of the knowledge situation as something which just 
exists or occurs, and whose nature is capable of revealing itself 
to an outside spectator. This is why the knowledg·e of knowl-
edge presents a different kind of problem from the lmowledge 
of sheer existences .and occurrences which the ingredients of 
nature are commonly supposed to be. Knowledge, ,vhich thus 
far we have taken to be primarily concerned with its terminus 
which is existence, reveals a new trait and a new ingredient 
when the concept of truth supervenes. There is an ideal and 
normative impact upon knowledge which comes, so to speak, 
from a direction opposite to that from which facts and things, 
data and existence press upon us. Janus-like, knowledge faces 
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111 two directions; toward existence, the given, the presented, 
and toward ideal standards fetched from the domain of truth. 
There is, for better or for ·worse, an intrusion of such ideal 
standards into all knowledge of existence. Truth grips exist-
ence, if at all, only through the medium of knowledge, and 
knowledge thus lies between truth and existence, subject to the 
constraint both of ideal standards and of existence. It is the 
intrusion of such ideal and normative factors into the kno,vleclge 
situation ·which makes it impossible in the encl to remain con-
tent with out initial . bifurcation of the cognitive interest 
concerned solely with existence, and non-cognitive attitudes im-
plicated vvith meanings. The theoretical and cognitive response 
of the mind to existence is shot through with ideals and pur-
poses which, while they are genuinely theoretical, are neverthe-
less generically similar to the demands with which we confront 
existence in any region of experience. 
If this intrusion of ideal criteria, of demands which we make 
even when we are bent solely upon lmowleclge, be resented as 
illegitimate, as obstructing or preventing the unalloyed knowl-
edge of pure existence, existence uncontaminated by meaning, 
then knowledge is condemned ab initio. "\Ve construct a trap 
to catch sheer existence, but the only trap ·which it lies in our 
· power to contrive, is one which catches existence permeated 
with meaning or, it may be, even meanings alone, divorced from 
existence, as in mathematics. In this case, existence is a veri-
table ding-an-sich, a substance transcending the area of mean-
ings which are lodged in lmowleclge. I mention this possibility 
in this place merely to point out that the concept of such a 
thing-in-itself or substance is the concept of existence uncon-
taminated by such meanings, by such ideal factors and standards 
as are incorporated in knowledge, and which, I have said, spring 
not from the linkage between knowledge and existence, but from 
that between knowledge and truth. Could this normative and 
ideal constraint upon knowledge from the side of truth be 
eliminated, then nothing would stand in the way at least of 
the possibility that existence could be known for what it is, 
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unspoilt by any intrusion of ideal considerations and standards, 
of interpretation and normative appraisal, of meanings, in short. 
But even so, even if it be supposed that this is what knowledge 
ought to be, a disclosure of existence purified from the dross 
of meaning, it should not be forgotten that this is itself the 
statement of an ideal of knowledge. It purports to tell ·what 
lmmvledge ought to be, even if in fact it ahvays falls short of 
the ideal through a failure to grasp pure existence-substance-
not qualified and distorted by the matrix of meanings in which 
knowledge such as we have is imbedded. A.nd this is a highly 
important characteristic of the knowledge situation and prob-
lem. It takes us back to the paradox which we noted at the 
outset. ,Ve want to know what lmo,vledge is, and we discover 
that we can only state what knowledge ought to be. A. pro-
cedure which we supposed to be descriptive turns out to be 
normative. We might suppose that we could survey knowledge 
from without, with no prepossession, no bias, committed to no 
judgment until after knowledge shall have delivered up its 
secret and disclosed its existing nature. But we find that our 
report as to what knowledge is implies a prior judgment as to 
what knowledge ought to be, that is, an ideal standard, as to 
what knowledge means when it is true knowledge. We thought 
we could get along with sheer existence and its disclosure to an 
external spectator or knower who may faithfully report the 
"facts" without intruding any demands or ideals of/ his own. 
What we find is that we have all along been using a criterion 
of what knowledge ought to be, derived from the ideal which 
belongs to truth. We began by assuming that knowledge was, 
in intention and aim, directed solely upon existence, and that 
this intention of the cognitive interest, whether realizable or 
not, was sufficient to discriminate it from all non-theoretical and 
practical interests. What confronts 'these latter is never sheer 
existence, but existence invested with meaning. This distinction 
between existence and meaning appeared to run parallel with 
the difference between two diverse functions or even kinds of 
mind. On the one hand there is a mind which is wholly con-
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cerned with and absorbed by the existences with which it is 
confronted, content solely with remarking and registering data, 
without intruding into the discovered existences any ideal 
ingredients whatever. This is mind contemplative and cognitive. 
On the other hand there is the mind whose energies and activities 
spring from wants and needs, the mind ·which is devoted either 
to wresting from the surrounding world that which is useful 
and good and significant, or in making over the bare neutral 
existences of nature into meaningful structures. This is mind 
vital and practical, instrumental and purposive. This -was the 
situation with which we were left until the concept of truth 
came upon the scene. A.nd it is this concept which brings into 
the knowledge situation an ideal factor, a normative ingredient, 
a regulative standard whose impact upon knowledge is no less 
than that ·which comes from the side of existence, of facts and 
data of whatever sort. It results from this that in knmvledge, 
we have to do not with existence simply, but also ·with meanings 
which are either derived from or correlated with such ideal 
factors as originate not in sheer, neutral existence but in the 
requirements of truth. In the remainder of this paper, I shall 
first expand this statement and then consider the question 
whether or not the presence in lmowledge of such ideal ingredi-
ents operates so as to frustrate the hope that in some measure 
what really exists may become accessible to our knowledge. 
Every sustained pursuit of knowledge in mathematics, 
science, history, or wherever else, is guided and directed not 
only by the material, the data, with which the knower is con-
fronted, but also by certain ideals of explanation and of intelli-
gibility. There is operative throughout every cognitive enter-
prise some specific pattern which the knower would like to see 
exemplified by and embodied in the area with ·which he is at 
work. A.nd it is only because of some discrepancy between what 
the knower would like to find and what he does find that there 
are scientific and theoretical problems. That thought and reflec-
tion, science and philosophy, are called into being by a problem 
is undeniably the case. That the given is problematic is indeed 
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true. But these are elliptical and condensed statements of a 
situation which is more complex than might at first be supposed. 
What I mean is that the problematic character of the given, of 
existences of any and every sort_ which are experienced, per-
ceived, intuited, imaged, or thought, does not fall entirely on 
the side of the given and the presented. It is not as if the 
given announced itself as a problem to a mind ·which is a mere 
spectator, bent wholly upon receiving and absorbing that which 
confronts it and is presented to it. The problematic character 
of the given has its source in the clash and discrepancy between 
that which is given and that which the mind wants but doesn't 
find in the given as merely given. .A. mind which isn't looking 
for something, which has nothing at stake, which is wholly per-
vious and diaphanous, would never find itself in the presence 
of a problem. Every teacher knows how impossible it is really 
to give students problems. You may give them data as much 
as you like. But these data become problematic, they stimulate 
search and reflection only to an active and inquiring mind, 
which wants and needs something which is not folmd in the 
given and which cannot be anything in the nature of a gift. 
No less true is it that the domains of existence which experience 
offers to our mind as data and as gifts, are problematic only 
because our minds are in search of something other than what 
is presented. .A. problematic datum implies a dissatisfied seeker. 
Just as it takes two to make a quarrel, so it requires a factor 
other than mere givenness or immediacy to make a problematic 
situation. In all literalness, data are never problematic in their 
own simple being or givenness. The esse of their problematic 
nature lies, not in its percipi, to be sure, but in the presence 
of something no less mind-dependent, that is, a character of 
unsatisfactoriness, a felt lack of meaning and of theoretical 
value. It is thus the discrepancy between what the mind has 
and what it wants, between the datum and some ideal, which 
lends to the given its problematic aspect. Were it not for the 
tension produced by this discrepancy, the mind might well be 
content to watch the panorama of things experienced float by, 
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asking no questions, having no doubts, untroubled by truth or 
error. And a mind such as this would indeed have no knowl-
edge. If I might turn to my own uses Mr. Santayana's dictum 
that "nothing· given exists," I should accept it as pointing to 
jl1st this fact. To say that whatever is indubitably and literally 
given is an essence and not an existence, is to say that the dis-
covery and recognition of reality-of what really exists-is 
never possible for a mind ·which passively intuits and acquiesces 
in the given. The distinction between essence and existence 
(in Mr. Santayana's sense), like that between appearance and 
reality, arises only for a mind whose experience and whose 
searchings are guided, in part at least, by ideals, by some notion 
of what it ·wants, and a perennial dissatisfaction with what it 
has in the shape of the given. What could possibly lead a sheer 
spectator, with no interests of his own, with _nothing at stake, 
to institute discriminations of ontological worth among the 
entities which float by before his intuition? Everything experi-
enced, whether sensed, perceived, imaged, dreamed, or thought 
of, has being and exists for ·the thing it is. The judgment that 
some or all of these are unreal, are but appearances or illusions, 
is the achievement of a mind which has standards and ideals, 
which actively wants something and in some measure knows 
wliat it is that it wants. 
The presence within knowledge of ideal ingredients which 
have a source other than in the given, is likely to be masked in 
proportion as we take smaller and smaller bits of knowledge 
and fasten our attention upon them. A scientific or philo-
sophical theory purports to explain a mass of facts, or data. 
A theory about the facts appears to contain much more which 
is ideal and hypothethical, which is the product of ideal con-
struction, than do the facts, the data, with reference to which 
the theory is constructed. We easily come to suppose and to 
say that we know the facts with a great deal more of certainty 
and assurance than we have with respect to any theory about 
the facts. But the situation is not so easily disposed of. We 
have to be on our_ guard against a perplexing ambiguity in the 
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notion of knowledge. Do we know the brute problematic data 
presented to us in experience~ We have them indeed; they 
are experienced and presented. But they are problematic be-
cause they are not the sort of thing which will satisfy us, which 
will meet our ideals of intelligibility and of truth. ·Knowledge 
of them, theoretical mastery of them, is not yet in our posses-
sion. When we come to know the data of perception, the solid 
massive things we see and touch, they all but disappear from 
the world known to exist. Knowledge of what the facts them-
selves really are awaits the formulation of a theory, and is 
subject to constant revision as one theory is supplanted by 
another. 
I have elsewhere1 defended the view that nowhere along the 
entire cognitive front from the most elementary sensory aware-
ness to the most speculative of theoretical constructions, do we 
find any place characterized by immediacy and nothing but im-
mediacy. In our present context, this is tantamount to the 
assertion that nowhere in our cognitive experience is there a 
coalescence of what the mind _has presented as a datum ( and 
hence immediate) and what the mind wants, what some ideal of 
explanation and of intelligibility demands. And for this reason, 
every datum is also the focus of interpretations, ideal construc-
tions and meanings which, whatever their origin and their 
validity, are co-present with every immediately presented datum. 
If you will have it that they are likewise immediate because such 
ideal constructions are there along with the immediate datum, 
you must at least recognize the very great difference between the 
two sorts of presentations. Such difference renders it ill advised, 
I think, to apply the ~djective ''immediate'' to both sets of 
entities. 
This is one ground for my rejection of any definition or 
theory of knowledge as the correspondence between ideas and 
objective facts. The ideas, judgmen_ts, and theories which, in a 
sense, we contrive and build up, penetrate and reconstruct the 
1 '' Immecliacy ancl Meaning,'' The Philosophical Review, XXXVIII, 
No. 2. 
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very facts to which, on the correspondence theory, they ought 
to conform. This intrusion of theory, interpretation, and mean-
ings into fae'ts, this unstable transmutation of initial problem-
atic data into facts, is due to the operation within knowledge of 
ideal standards, of ideals of explanation, having their source 
not in data or in facts, but in the ideal requirements imposed 
by truth. The recognition that knowledge is not acquiescence 
in the given, but the incessant interpretation of the given in 
accordance with ideal standards does not, of course,: by itself 
provide any insight into the specific nature of such ideals of 
explanation and of intelligibility. To recognize the discrepancy 
between what we have and what we want need not presuppose 
any full and clear lmowledge of what it is that we really want. 
Is it a world of independent things with reciprocal causal rela-
tions which our ideals of explanation demand¥ Or shall we 
fasten upon the Parmenidean axiom that since identity alone 
is intelligible, the scientific intelligence demands the annihila-
tion of diversity, and see with M. Meyerson in al~ science the 
effort to identify the diverse 1 Or shall we define intelligibility 
in terms of some species of continuity, which is a little less than 
Parmenidean identity, admitting some measure of change and 
traJ;).sition, provided it be not too abrupt 1 Or shall we envisage 
intelligibility as the systematic organization and coherence of 
cliversity and unity, bound together into a concrete universal¥ 
Is all kno,vledge guided by the search for a single unconclitioned 
totality, What specific types of meaning do we search for in 
the effort to comprehend and grasp theoretically some province 
of existing facts and o.ccurrences ¥ We cannot proceed to any 
consideration,of these questions here, but must content ourselves 
with the statement that in every sustained cognitive enterprise 
there are ideals of explanation which denote the formal char-
acteristics of what the knowing mind is seeking. They are the 
source of the discrepancy between the given and the wanted, 
between data-brute data if you will-and intelligible data, 
between a problem and its solution. Cognition has its ideals, 
norms and purposes, no less than do our practical and non-
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theoretical interests. Some theoretical ideal always directs the 
explanation and interpretation of any mass of data whatever . 
.And this ideal, like any genuine ideal, has to express the life, 
the nature, and the interests of the mind or self which posits it. 
In proportion to the degree of success which the knowing mind 
attains, the objects of its knowledge cease to be sheer existences 
and become existences suffused with meanings, ·with theoretical 
values. 
But now, in admitting and stressing such considerations as 
these, are we not caught between the horns of a dilemma, that 
dilemma which perennially trails along in the wake of every 
attempt to deal with the nature of truth f You admit, it ·will 
be urged, that every organized body of lrnowledg·e, of luwwn 
and understood data, is permeated by meanings derived from 
the ideals of explanation and intelligibility which express the 
theoretical interests and demands of the knowing subject. But 
the intent of knowledge is nevertheless existence itself, exist-
ence which is independent of and unmodified by any interests 
or ideals of the knower. You are then faced with this alterna-
tive. Either independent existence is inaccessible to us because 
we can know only existences which are caught within the net 
of our meanings, of our human categories and discourse; or you 
must be willing completely to ignore and deny any existence 
untrammeled by meanings which we impute to and weave into 
the objects of our attention and interest. You must go either 
the way of skepticism, agnosticism, and radical dualism, or the 
way of humanism and pragmatism. In neither case is there 
any genuine possibility of a metaphysics, a knowledge of the 
independently real. This whole situation is of course nothing 
but the ego-centric dilemma, writ large. 
I believe that there is still another possibility. The two 
alternatives just now indicated, antithetic as they are, neverthe-
less issue from a common assumption and premise. They both 
presuppose that there can be no correlate in existence of the 
meaning·s which spring from the mind's own ideals of expla-
nation and of intellig·ibility. Both types of theory assume that 
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the interpretations and ideal constructions of which all science 
and knowledge are compacted, are barred from being discov-
eries and disclosures of objective meanings precisely because 
they arise through the construction and purposive activities of 
the mind as theoretical. The mind, through its activities, theo-
retical as well as practical, is conceived on the analogy of a 
factory whose products reveal the machinery which turns them 
out. Such products in no way disclose the nature of anything 
which exists independently of the processes of map_ufacture. If 
such artificial products existed in rerwn natiira, awaiting dis-
covery, it were idle and foolish for us to construct them. 
But the situation becomes altogether different if there should 
really exist, independently of us, any entities or intrinsic con-
stituents of entities, whose very discovery is dependent upon 
active processes of ideal construction and interpretation. The 
meanings which existences seem to acquire when they are thus 
interpreted, explained, or in any way made significant, would 
in this case be disclosed and discovered through those construc-
tive activities of the mind which formerly appeared only to 
generate them. 
There is nothing strange or surprising about this possibility. 
The disclosure to any organism of what exists in its environment 
is dependent upon the presence of an appropriate organ. If 
objects are to be touched and felt there must be sense organs 
of touch. If things are to be seen there must be eyes. The 
biological evolution of sense organs is at the same time a growth 
and modification of the segments and dimensions of the acces-
sible environment. Not much more than the environment im-
mediately contiguous with the skin can be perceived through 
touch. The eyes are distance receptors. Memory and anticipa-
tion do for the time dimension what the eyes do for space. If 
now the larger sweep of rhythms and patterns in nature is 
capable of being disclosed at all, there is needed for their appre-
hension the whole apparatus of scientific inventiveness, scientific 
instruments, processes of thought and reasoning, the elaborations 
of mathematical invention, ideal constructions of the most varied 
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kind. Were it not for these ideal constructions, we would be 
as blind to the relational and intelligible structures of our world 
as we would be to colors did we not have eyes. If ·we are to get 
at them at all, it can only be because we are willing to give free 
play to such processes of ideal construction. They are discover-
able, if at all, only through such types of inventiveness. .Auel 
by what else could these ideal constructions be guided if not by 
ideals of explanation and intelligibility lodged in the reason as 
theoretical 1 I do no more here than to present this as an alter-
native hypothesis to both of those positions which would other-
wise constrain our choice. You must either-so runs the usual 
alternative-take the notion of independent reality, of sub-
stance, of the indefeasible existence of things and occurrences 
and energies in all seriousness, or you must forego the hope of 
any genuine knowledge, of any metaphysics, of any science 
which does more than take into its reckoning the- nature and 
order of the experiences which are vouchsafed to us, ·wholly 
contingent as they must perforce be upon our sense org·ans and 
nervous systems, our grammar and discourse, our perspective 
and ordering. Either realism and dualism, or humanism and 
positivism. .And if you go thB first of these two ways, if you 
affirm the existence and reality of substance_, you are still com-
pelled to admit that every alleged description, knowledge, or 
judgment about substantive existences is shot through with 
terms, categories, and meanings originating in our ways of 
thought, belief, and discourse. So that all of the significant 
terms which we apply to existence are the fruits of our inter-
pretations and ideal constructions woven around and imputed 
to an existence which has no claim to them in its own right. 
The initial premise is here the belief that ideal constructions 
in thought and discourse cannot be vehicles through ·which objec-
tive meanings are disclosed. It is this premise which I question. 
How else could objective meanings be revealed to our minds save 
through active processes of ideal construction? I confess I do 
not know. And I do know of instances where something like 
this surely occurs. The markings on the Rosetta Stone do 
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really, I suppose, possess a kind of meaning which the glacial 
markings of rocks do not have. What these inscriptions of the 
Rosetta Stone mean could never be disclosed to a mind content 
to resume or to echo or contemplate merely the existing marks 
themselves. Nor would these meanings become evident, if the 
entire causal series of occurrences initiated by the neuro-muscu-
lar events in the bodies and hands of the ancient Egyptians were 
completely presented to a comtemplatively cognitive mind. The 
apprehension of such objective meanings is dependent upon 
active processes of interpretation and ideal construction. Just 
as the problematic character of data is not presented in any 
sheer· datum itself as a gift and hence cannot be simply found, 
so it is with meanings, with the theoretically significant aspects 
of data which render them understandable. The intelligible 
and theoretical meanings of the glacial markings too, though 
they express no human or conscious intent, are likewise accessible 
only to a mind willing to enter upon a sustained process of 
reflection and hypothetical construction. But it does not neces-
sarily follow that the theoretical meanings whicn are thus 
elaborated in thought, inference, and reflection may not be the 
very meanings whjch the glacial markings themselves really own. 
I take it that the central problem about all inference and 
reflection is this. Wherever there is thinking there is, to use 
the term of Locke and Bradley, an ''operation.'' • It is an oper-
ation performed upon some datum. But the extraordinary and 
paradoxical thing about such operations is that their results are 
ascribed to and appropriated by the datum itself. How can 
this be? That it should be so shocks us only because we assume 
that the existence disclosed in the datum is a bare nucleus 
around which we weave our meanings and then illegitimately 
impute them to the object. It is this assumption and the whole 
conceptual framework which supports. it, that I think we need 
to scrutinize. I am not content with the view according to 
which the categorial characters of existence, those which make 
existence theoretically significant, are spread out before the 
mind in the same way as are existential and occurrent data. 
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This was, as I see it, the theme of the classical Greek tradition, 
restated in our time by Mr . .Alexander. Nor am I content with 
the drift of the naturalistic tradition, powerfully imparted to 
our modern thought by the scientific revolution of the seven-
teenth century, that the significant aspects of our world-all 
that makes it intelligible and livable-are essentially human 
and artificial constructs, adventitious to a substantive existence 
which is wholly neutral with respect to all meaning and all 
value. This tradition finds its classical expression both in the 
philosophy of Kant, as usually interpreted, and in that of 
Hume. Knowledge is indeed concerned ·with existence. But the 
quest of knowledge is throughout guided by ideals, evincing at 
every stage from perception to the elaboration of hypotheses 
and theories, the constraint of theoretical ideals. The hypothesis 
that these active operations of the mind provide the one in-
dispensable vehicle through which the inexhaustible wealth of 
objective meanings native to existence can be known and dis-
closed, seems to me an hypothesis worth the venture. Itself, 
like all metaphysical ventures, is an ideal construction, and not, 
if we are right, thereby precluded from disclosing the nature 
of things. 
